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Two clearly undesirable but plausible scenarios merit serious consideration by the Alliance. The 
first is: What should and can the Alliance do if efforts to prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear 
weapons fail? Specifically, how can the Alliance contribute to developing and supporting a 
deterrent structure designed to minimize the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran? 
The second: The United States, most recently in a speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
in October 2008, has announced an “expanded deterrence” policy against terrorism conducted 
with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[1] How does this policy interact with U.S. 
commitments under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty? Should the Alliance as a whole adopt a 
similar policy? If so, how could an integrated policy be operationalized? If not, how could the 
other Alliance members work with the U.S. policy? 
With respect to the nuclear-armed Iran scenario, it should be emphasized that it is the policy of 
the United States, Canada, and the European Alliance members that Iran be dissuaded from 
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, and it is of course sincerely to be hoped that these efforts 
bear fruit. But it is surely wise to consider the not implausible scenario that, despite these and 
other nations’ efforts, Iran may succeed in developing and deploying nuclear weapons. The 
dangers such an eventuality would present include proliferation in the region and worldwide 
through the weakening of the global nonproliferation structure; instability due to regional rivalries 
and perilously postured nuclear forces, possibly leading to disruptions to energy and economic 
flows; and, of course, the heightened possibility of nuclear use. Clearly, an Iranian bomb would 
pose serious challenges to the Alliance’s interests. It may therefore be taken as a given in this 
scenario that NATO would want to take steps to minimize the negative consequences of such an 
eventuality. This paper considers how it could do so at reasonable cost and in light of existing 
political realities. 
The United States could lead the development of a deterrent structure in the Middle East region 
that would assure its allies and partners, deter Iranian use of nuclear weapons, negate the 
significant advantages accruing to Tehran from the acquisition of nuclear arms, and obviate the 
need among countries in the region for follow-on proliferation. The strategy would seek to show to 
Iran and to the region that Tehran would not gain any significant benefits from acquiring nuclear 
weapons—excepting only protection from violent regime change by external powers and 
prestige—while also making clear that Iran would be held to a high standard of liability not only for 
the use of nuclear arms but also for the transfer of nuclear weapons or technology and for 
negligence or loss. 
To form a “deterrent structure” the United States and other interested parties would work to build 
a politico-strategic association or structure in the Middle East to defend key states and interests, 
such as the free flow of oil, by deterring and, if necessary, defending against Iranian aggression. 
While such a structure would need to be flexible and responsive, reflecting the interests of the 
involved countries rather than being imposed on the region, a few steps would almost certainly be 
involved. For instance, the United States should consider reaffirming and strengthening its 
commitments to the defense of the key Gulf states tracing back from President Roosevelt’s 
meeting with Ibn Saud through the Carter Doctrine and Desert Shield to today’s Gulf Security 
Dialogue. While the United States and countries in the region have historically been 
uncomfortable with formal security guarantees, a strong reaffirmation of U.S. commitments to 
prevent dominance of the Gulf by a hostile power could be useful, especially if delivered by the 
President. 
In terms of declaratory policy, the United States could reiterate through a variety of media, directly 
and indirectly, that it is prepared to respond overwhelmingly and potentially in kind to Iranian 
nuclear employment against key states and interests and that American retaliation would be 
indisputably devastating to Iran and whatever objectives it was trying to pursue. At the political 
level, this could take the form of statements by senior U.S. officials, including the President, the 
Secretary of Defense, and military commanders. The potentially damaging political consequences 
from such statements would be alleviated by the fact that Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition, in 
violation of the NPT, would render irrelevant the U.S. negative security assurances issued in 
connection with the Treaty.[2] 
Militarily, the United States and other interested parties could productively deploy nuclear-
capable, missile defense, and conventional strike forces to the region, especially on maritime and 
aerial platforms. For instance, the United States might look into the deliberately noticeable 
deployment of U.S. nuclear forces into the region, including through strategic bomber flights, 
dual-capable aircraft, and/or the re-installment of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. surface vessels 
and attack submarines (though obviously this would have arms control ramifications).[3] The 
United States and other interested parties could also deploy additional conventional forces, such 
as strike aircraft and naval forces armed with cruise missiles, which could be used in retaliatory 
strikes against Iran as well as for direct defense of vital interests. Air and missile defenses would 
also play a vital role. By degrading the probability of success of Iranian strikes, theater air and 
missile defenses would weaken Iran’s confidence in its own capabilities, assure allies, protect 
U.S. and partner forces, and constitute a demonstration of U.S. and partner resolve. Defenses 
against intercontinental missile threats could also help defeat Iranian attempts to threaten North 
America or Europe and alleviate classic de-coupling concerns among regional partners. Finally, 
the United States and other interested parties could establish or strengthen relationships with 
states in the region designed to build up internal security capabilities, share intelligence, and 
improve state capacity with the goal of blunting the threat of Iranian subversion. This would be 
particularly important in order to minimize Iran’s advantages from its nuclear capability at lower 
levels of escalation. The Gulf Security Dialogue and existing relationships with key Arab states 
such as Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia already offer firm platforms for such an effort. 
Regarding Iranian covert use, transfer, or negligence, the United States should also consider 
specifically focusing the doctrine of expanded liability for WMD use announced by Secretary 
Gates on Iran, thereby putting Tehran on notice about the perils of possessing nuclear weapons. 
This could be done privately or publicly, directly or indirectly, or some combination thereof. 
Most of the focus here has been on U.S. efforts, but much of the challenge in developing and 
sustaining a deterrent structure against a nuclear-armed Iran would actually be political, and it is 
here that NATO could probably make a great contribution. To repeat: the purpose of the structure 
would be to negate significant Iranian advantages from acquiring nuclear weapons, deter Iranian 
use of nuclear weapons, and convince other countries in the region not to pursue nuclear 
weapons of their own—and much of the effectiveness of these aims would be aided by countries 
believing that the United States and other external powers would actually live up to their 
commitments, including military and other coercive action. This would require addressing the 
perennial credibility problem. Clear evidence of broad international political support for a difficult 
posture would make that posture much more credible and workable. In practical terms, NATO 
nations could contribute to the credibility of a deterrent structure in the Middle East by openly 
endorsing it through, for instance, a North Atlantic Council communiqué and by affirming that they 
would severely condemn—and cooperate in responding to—nuclear use or coercion by Iran; by 
providing logistical support, basing and overflight permissions, and funding for activities related to 
the structure, including capacity-building and training; by urging key states in the region not to 
pursue nuclear programs of their own in response to Iran’s; by maintaining public diplomacy and 
political pressure against Iran as an NPT violator through the UN, IAEA, and other fora; and, of 
course, by directly contributing military forces, even relatively modest ones, to the posture. In 
addition to serving the objectives of preserving stability and discouraging proliferation in an area 
of key Alliance concern, such involvement would also not unduly tax the Alliance’s resources. 
Because the Alliance’s role would be largely political, much of the work would be diplomatic and 
therefore relatively inexpensive. Further, even for the United States and other Alliance members 
wishing to become involved militarily, some of the forces most suited for the deterrent, defensive, 
and retaliatory functions required would be precisely those aerial and maritime forces least 
exercised in the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. That said, such an effort would require 
significant investment in certain kinds of capabilities, especially missile defenses and strike 
capabilities, and considerable flexibility in working to assure key countries, especially Israel. 
Broadly, the Alliance should identify ways in which it could contribute to deterring a nuclear-
armed Iran from destabilizing a vital region and preventing proliferation both in the Middle East 
and globally. These are viable goals and within the economic resources and political constraints 
of the Alliance members. Dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran would principally be a question of will 
and commitment to an appropriate deterrence posture. NATO could play a critical role in 
supporting this effort. 
The second plausible scenario examined in this paper concerns how NATO should respond to 
the new U.S. deterrence policy against WMD terrorism. Catastrophic terrorism, while not 
necessarily a high probability event in the near term, is nonetheless a real and potentially 
calamitous threat. As destructive power and technology spread outwards to more marginal 
entities and downwards to smaller groups, the possibility of a grave attack is too plausible to 
dismiss and must, therefore, be planned for. The United States has taken a critically important 
step in this direction by making clear that it has expanded its deterrent posture against WMD 
terrorism. It has done so by pledging to hold not only those directly involved accountable, but also 
those state or non-state entities or individuals that support or enable such an attack. As Secretary 
Gates stated in his October 2008 speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
“[T]he United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor or individual fully 
accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass 
destruction whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such 
efforts.” This shift in deterrence policy is important because it means that the United States is 
prepared to take far more expansive retaliatory action in the wake of an attack than would be 
contemplated under a narrower understanding of liability. The United States has thus made any 
involvement—even seemingly marginal—in a WMD strike extremely perilous, and this may deter 
adversaries from carrying out such attacks. 
Nothing similar has been promulgated by NATO, though statements in 2006 by Prime Minister 
Blair and President Chirac offer parallels among individual NATO nations.[4] This leaves a 
worrying gap in doctrine between the United States and most of its NATO partners and raises a 
host of questions that should be worked out before such an attack occurs. For instance, would 
and should catastrophic attacks on non-U.S. NATO members be addressed in the same manner 
as Secretary Gates described, or would retaliation take a more limited form, or should this be left 
ambiguous? In both the Gates speech and Stephen Hadley’s initial announcement of the policy in 
a February 2008 speech at Stanford University, the question of the expanded deterrence policy’s 
applicability to allies was left unaddressed. The NATO allies should adopt a similar policy, or at 
the very least reach an understanding about what would be expected should a NATO member 
suffer such an attack. 
An even more troubling scenario might be posited: What if an attack occurred against the United 
States or another NATO country by a group operating from another NATO country (of course, 
without that country’s approval)? What kinds of actions, standards, and processes would this 
expanded deterrence policy require of NATO governments in response to such an attack? What 
would be expected of NATO members both in advance of (and in the wake of) WMD terrorist 
attacks in terms of security, legal, compensatory, military, and other efforts? It seems clear that 
NATO should be prepared as an alliance to deal intelligently and rationally with these questions in 
advance of such an attack, rather than in the heat, confusion, and rancor of its aftermath. 
Addressing these questions is a simple necessity in light of the imperfectly aligned doctrines 
among NATO partners. The Alliance can be a beneficiary of and a participant in the policy rather 
than merely adapting to the new doctrine articulated by the United States, and so should actually 
adopt such a policy as an Alliance. Properly formulated, such a common policy would benefit all 
members by bringing the weight of the Alliance behind an expanded deterrent posture that would 
be strengthened by being issued and endorsed by many countries, since such a posture is more 
likely to be seen as credible if backed by many nations. Non-U.S. Alliance members would benefit 
from the advantages of a collective posture likely to increase substantially the effectiveness of 
deterrence against WMD terrorism. The United States and all members would benefit from the 
collective strength and legitimacy that multiple allies would supply for a policy that relies on 
credibility, legitimacy, capability, and reach for its effectiveness. The policy would also help 
countries to meet their international legal obligations to combat WMD proliferation and use under 
UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, among other authorities. Of course, it should be 
emphasized that any NATO policy would not supplant nor place veto restrictions on U.S. or any 
national policy; rather, it would supplement national policies. 
Yet neither simple doctrinal consistency nor collective endorsement of an expanded deterrence 
posture can emerge from inertia. Because it is a difficult, demanding, and complicated policy in 
either unilateral or multilateral manifestations, digesting and integrating the policy will require 
serious deliberation among the NATO allies. It therefore seems proper to launch a discussion on 
this proposed element of the response to the threat of catastrophic terrorism. 
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